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THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE UNI-
FORM PRICE MAINTENANCE PROVISIONS OF THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT OF 1940*
Murray L. Simpson** and Scott Hodes***
I. Introduction and Scope
The dust of battle has yet to settle on recent attacks made on Section 22(d),
the uniform price maintenance provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940' [hereinafter cited as the "1940 Act"], by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission2 and by Senators John Sparkman of Alabama' and Thomas J. Mc-
Intyre of New Hampshire.4 Basically, Section 22(d) of the 1940 Act requires
that any sale of a redeemable security issued by any investment company regis-
tered' under the 1940 Act, by its principal underwriter or any dealer, be made
to "any person" (except a dealer) only "at a current public offering price
described in the prospectus." 6 In other words, the retail offering price of a mutual
fund share must be uniform to retail purchasers.
This article will examine the background and content of Section 22(d)
and the SEC's Rule 22d-1, and then consider the proposed amendment to that
rule and the above mentioned legislative attacks on Section 22 (d) itself. Through-
out, the authors will demonstrate the reasons why Rule 22d-1 should not be
amended as proposed and why Section 22(d) should not be repealed.
This article was completed on April 8, 1969.
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1958; LL.B., De Paul University, 1961; member, Arvey,
Hodes & Mantynband, Chicago, Illinois; former Staff Attorney, Securities and Exchange Com-
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*** A.B., University of Chicago, 1956; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1959; LL.M., North-
western University, 1963; member, Arvey, Hodes & Mantynband, Chicago. Illinois.
1 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1964).
2 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwTH, H.R. REP.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1966) [hereinafter cited as the SEC 1966 REPORT]. See
also SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968).
3 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(c) (1969).
4 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
5 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 '(1964).
6 Section 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1964), reads as follows:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by it
to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution or
at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of
security is being currently offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no
principal underwriter of such security and no dealer shall sell any such security to
any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter or the issuer, except at a current
public offering price described in the prospectus: Provided, however, That nothing
in this subsection shall prevent a sale made (i) pursuant to an offer of exchange
permitted by section 11 hereof including any offer made pursuant to clause (1) or
(2) of section 11 "(b) ; (ii) pursuant to an offer made solely to all registered holders
of the securities, or of a particular class or series of securities issued by the company
proportionate to their holdings or proportionate to any cash distribution made to
them by the company (subject to appropriate qualifications designed solely to avoid
issuance of fractional securities); or (iii) in accordance with rules and regulations
of the Commission made pursuant to subsection (b) of section 12.
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
II. Pre-1940
While the legislative history of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is
relatively silent on the reasons for the passage of Section 22(d), the purposes
underlying the provisions of this section have been alluded to as being (1) to
prevent discrimination among purchasers, (2) to provide for an orderly distribu-
tion of mutual fund shares, and (3) to prevent "cut-throat" competition between
those dealers who were under contract with a principal underwriter and those
who were not.7
Prior to the enactment of Section 22 (d) investment dealers who had entered
into distribution agreements with principal underwriters or registered investment
companies were placed at a competitive disadvantage by dealers who were selling
these shares without any contractual restrictions. Dealers who had contracts with
a principal underwriter were obligated to offer shares in a mutual fund subject
to a predetermined sales charge, while non-contractual dealers could offer the
same shares subject to any sale charge they chose to set. Moreover, non-con-
tractual dealers could take advantage of large underwriting spreads by pur-
chasing shares directly from investors or from an over-the-counter trading market
at prices somewhat lower than the prices being paid by contract dealers, thereby
being in a position to offer these shares at different prices.8 As a result of this
market environment, dealers were cancelling their contracts with principal un-
derwriters, thus creating a disruption in the orderly and continuous system of
distributing mutual fund shares. The advocates of enacting Section 22(d)
sought to curtail this type of competition in order to prevent discrimination
among purchasers and to insure the orderly distribution essential for a security
having the unique feature of continuous redeemability. The passage of Section
22 (d) was the legislative antidote.
III. The Aftermath: 1940-1958
Operating under the mandate of Section 22 (d) - orderly distrilution and
prevention of price discrimination - the SEC issued an interpretive release in
1941 making it clear that the charging of varying prices for varying amounts
of securities based on a "uniform scale of sales loads" is permissible if the "cur-
rent offering price" is readily ascertainable by a reading of the prospectus.9
Since the purpose of the disclosure of the "current offering price" is to prevent
"discrimination among investors," it was therefore established shortly after the
enactment of the 1940 Act that "at least one of the purposes" of Section 22(d)
was to assure uniform non-discriminatory treatment of purchasers of mutual
fund shares. In interpreting the meaning of "current offering price"' to allow
varying prices for varying amounts, i.e., quantity discounts, this release dealt only
7 SEC 1966 REPORT 219. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 829, 831
(1960). For a thorough discussion of Section 22(d) from its enactment through 1959, see
Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 37 U. DET. L.J. 369 (1960).
8 The pre-1940 trading market is described in SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS
AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. 2, at 324-25 (1940).
9 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 89 (March 13, 1941).
10 Id.
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with a "single investment" of a specified sum. Relying on the SEC's acquiescence
in quantity discounts in this situation, many investment companies soon became
liberal in their interpretation of what would be considered a "single investment"
or a "single transaction" for purposes of obtaining a quantity discount, and as
a direct result, allowed such discounts for "single" purchases by a trustee, fidu-
ciary, or custodian acting for, or on behalf of, more than one account.1 ' Invest-
ment companies considered the fiduciary or other representative making the pur-
chases as a "single purchaser," thus coming within the purview of "any person"
under the provisions of Section 22(d). The practice of aggregating purchases
by "any person" as a "single transaction" soon led to the wholesale formation of
hybrid group purchase arrangements to take advantage of the quantity discount.
Even those companies that were not so liberal in their interpretation of a
"single transaction" received favorable responses from the SEC when they asked
permission to give a discount for aggregated transactions. Examples can be found
in two opinions issued by the SEC in 1950. In Investors Diversified Services,
Incorporated, the Commission approved a cumulative volume discount which
entitled an investor to a reduction in sales load for the current purchase when
his aggregate purchases to date reached or passed a sales breakpoint."2 In
Axe Houghton Fund, Incorporated, the SEC approved a volume discount for
the aggregate purchase of shares in more than one mutual fund distributed by
the same principal underwriter.3 (While volume discounts and varying sales
loads based on the quantity of shares sold does enhance price discrimination be-
tween different investors based on their financial ability to make a larger dollar
commitment, a recent judicial attack alleging that such practices created price
discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act was thwarted when the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that "the
system of cumulative quantity discounts in the sale of mutual fund shares is
governed exclusively by the SEC under the Investment Company Act, and is
immune from attack under the Robinson-Patman Act.")14
In short, the widespread practice of freely interpreting a "single transaction"
to obtain a group discount caused concern among both the industry and the SEC
over the uniform price standard requirement of Section 22(d). A former SEC
official, in commenting on the development of these practices, stated that:
[I]t soon became obvious from the widespread and increasing number of
group plans that they were not being devised spontaneously by astute in-
vestors but were receiving their inspiration from specialists. Industry leaders
and organizations, alarmed by the inroads being made upon the uniform
11 Some investment companies did obtain specific SEC exemptive relief for such "dis-
counts" pursuant to Section 6(c) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) '(1964). Greene,
supra note 7, at 377.
12 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1504 (Aug. 15, 1950). It is interesting to
note that the SEC has recently suspended part of a brokerage firm's mutual fund sales activ-
ities where sales were made close to, but under, a sales charge breakpoint on the basis that
salesmen are "duty bound" to advise customers of the breakpoint. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8501 (Jan. 22, 1969).
13 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1505 (Aug. 17, 1950).
14 Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Ill. 1968), appeal
docketed, No ............. , 7th Cir.. .........................
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price standard, appealed to the Commission to stem what appeared to be
evasions of the statute.'5 (Footnote omitted.)
The Commission's response is next considered.
IV. The Era of Rule 22d-1
The Commission soon concluded that the industry practice of allowing
quantity discounts to various groups of investors was undesirable because (1)
some members of these groups were not being furnished with a prospectus of the
fund and (2) discrimination contrary to the intent of Section 22(d) was being
practiced since reduced group prices were not being granted to individual mem-
bers of the public on the basis of the quantity purchased but rather to numerous
individuals comprising so-called selected "classes" of persons. These abuses were
further compounded by the cooperative attitude of certain investment companies,
which were soliciting or encouraging group purchases contrary to the spirit and
intent of Section 22 (d) .16
After notice and public hearings on these abusive industry practices, the
SEC promulgated Rule 22d-1,'7 which became effective on April 30, 1959.
15 Greene, supra note 7, at 379.
16 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2718 '(May 28, 1958).
17 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1(1967). Rule 22d-1 provides in part as follows:
A registered investment company which is the issuer of redeemable securities, a
principal underwriter of such securities or a dealer therein shall be exempted from
the provisions of Section 22(d) to the extent necessary to permit the sale of such
securities by such persons at prices which reflect reductions in, or eliminations of, the
sales load under any of the following circumstances:(a) In accordance with a scale of reducing sales load varying with the quantity
of securities purchased by any person. The quantity entitling any person to any such
reduced sales load may be computed on any of the following bases, and may include
redeemable securities of other registered investment companies having the same
principal underwriter as the issuer of such securities: (1) the aggregate quantity of
securities being purchased at any one time; (2) the aggregate quantity of securities
previously purchased or acquired and then owned plus the securities being purchased;
or (3) the aggregate quantity of securities purchased by any person within a period
of no more than 13 months from the date of and pursuant to a written state-
ment of his intention, accepted by the underwriter, which provides that the pur-
chaser intends, but is not obligated, to purchase securities within such period in a
specified aggregate amount which would entitle the purchaser to a quantity discount
if purchased at one time, and which further provides that each purchase made pur-
suant to the statement shall be made either (i) at the price applicable to the quan-
tity of securities being purchased in each separate transaction until at least a sufficient
quantity of securities has been purchased to qualify for a discount pursuant to the
statement, or until the aggregate quantity specified therein has been purchased,
whereupon a retroactive price adjustment for all purchases theretofore made under
the statement to reflect the quantity discount to which the purchaser is then
entitled pursuant to the statement shall be made by the underwriter and the dealer
involved, if any, or (ii) at the price applicable to the intended aggregate quantity
of securities specified by the purchaser, provided that an amount of the securities
purchased shall be retained by the underwriter or held by a bank escrow agent
pursuant to terms and conditions which will reasonably assure that the full applicable
sales load will be charged if the purchaser does not complete the intended pur-
chases. The statement of intention may also provide that, if the total purchases
made within the period covered by the statement exceed the amount specified by
the purchaser as his expected aggregate purchases, and equal an aggregate amount
which would, if purchased at a single time, qualify for an additional quantity dis-
count, a retroactive price adjustment shall be made by the underwriter and the
dealer involved, if any, for all purchases made under the statement to reflect the
quantity discount applicable to the aggregate amount of such purchases.
[Vol. 44:718]
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This rule codified certain previous administrative interpretations of Section 22 (d)
which allowed variations in the sales load to "any person." Previous Commission
policy, as reflected by both exemptions and permissive industry practices, per-
mitted groupings of purchases for quantity discounts where such groupings were
voluntarily arranged without inducement by the issuer or the sales representative.
However, by adopting Rule 22d-1, the SEC restricted the definition of "any
person" in the statute so that group purchases, whether made directly or indi-
rectly through a trustee, agent, custodian or other representative, could no longer
qualify as a single purchase under Section 22(d). The term "any person" en-
titled to a quantity discount was specifically limited to include only (1) an in-
dividual together with his spouse and their minor children purchasing for his
own or their own account and (2) a trustee or other fiduciary purchasing for a
single trust estate or single fiduciary account (including a pension, profit sharing,
or other employee benefit trust created pursuant to a plan qualified under section
401 of the Internal Revenue Code) although more than one beneficiary was
involved."
In effect, Rule 22d-1 departs from the "single transaction" theory and
focuses upon the phrase "any person" as being the true statutory test. According
to one legal authority, Rule 22d-1 "has done much to bring order and stability
into the pricing methods of the mutual funds and uniformity to the form of pros-
pectus disclosures made."' 9 In further enforcing the mandate of Section 22(d)
and the intent of its rule promulgated thereunder, the Commission, in 1960,
denied an exemption request by an investment company which sought to con-
tinue the practice of selling to certain organizations of professional people at
reduced sales loads based upon aggregating the purchases of all members of
the particular organization. In denying the requested exemption, a unanimous
Commission held that "[t]he purposes of the Section [22(d)] are to prevent
discrimination among purchasers and to provide for an orderly distribution of
such shares by preventing their sale at a price less than that fixed in the pros-
pectus." 20
The next critical examination of Section 22(d) developed from the SEC's
attack on the overall level of sales charges. The SEC, in its 1966 Report, stated
that the growth and size of the mutual fund industry had reached the point
The scale of reducing sales load and the method of computation utilized shall be
specifically described in the prospectus and shall be applicable to sales to all persons.
As used in this paragraph (a) the term "any person" shall include (i) an
individual, or an individual, his spouse and their children under the age of 21, pur-
chasing securities for his or their own account, and (ii) a trustee or other fiduciary
purchasing securities for a single trust estate or single fiduciary account (including
a pension, profit-sharing, or other employee benefit trust created pursuant to a plan
qualified under Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code) although more than one
beneficiary is involved: Provided, however, That the term "any person" shall not
include a group of individuals whose funds are combined, directly or indirectly, for
the purchase of redeemable securities of a registered investment company jointly or
through a trustee, agent, custodian, or other representative, nor shall it include a
trustee, agent, custodian, or other representative of such a group of individuals.
18 For a more complete analysis of Rule 22d-1, see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
406-10 (1961). For commentary concerning the rationale for inclusion of certain allowable
reductions in sales charges, see Note, The SEC Ruling Forbidding Quantity Discounts on Group
Purchases from Mutual Investment Companies, 43 MINN. L. Rav. 1212 (1959).
19 GREENE, supra note 7, at 387.
20 Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 829, 831 (1960).
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where sales loads involved in the purchase of mutual fund shares should be re-
examined. According to this same report,
[m]ore than a quarter of a century of experience shows that the ,sort of
competition which in fact generally prevails, i.e., competition among prin-
cipal underwriters for the favor of retail dealers rather than price compe-
tition among retail dealers, has had the effect of raising rather than lowering
prices to the investor.21
The SEC then concluded, arbitrarily we believe, that mutual fund sales charges
should be lowered. It noted that one of the methods it had considered to achieve
this objective would be the removal of the retail price maintenance provisions
of Section 22(d), which it felt "would enable retail dealers to attract customers
by offering lower prices."22 After further analysis, however, the SEC conceded
that removal of the retail price maintenance provisions of Section 22(d) would
create certain "disadvantages" including:
(1) The introduction of free competition might at least temporarily favor
captive organizations that are the sole distributors of the fund shares they
sell. While indirect competition resulting from public awareness of lower
sales charges for shares of other mutual funds would in all probability
eventually force captive organizations to reduce their prices, captive organiza-
tions would for a time enjoy an unwarranted disparity in sales compensation.
They might be able to attract salesmen away from independent dealers who
would be subject to direct price competition. Many principal underwriters
might abandon distribution through independent dealers in favor of captive
sales organizations. Thus, if the Act be amended to permit price compe-
tition in the sale of mutual fund shares, the Commission should be authorized
to adopt rules designed to bring the captives' charges into line with sales
charges paid by purchasers of dealers' distributed fund shares.
(2) Retail price competition would permit knowledgeable investors
to purchase mutual fund shares at sales loads substantially lower than
those now prevailing, but others - among them those most in need of
protection - might save little or nothing. This disadvantage is mitigated
by the likelihood that dealers, rather than risking their good business repu-
tation, would charge the same prices to all of their customers who invest
the same amount in shares of a particular fund.23
As a consequence of these findings, the SEC concluded that Section 22 (d) should
be maintained but that a fixed maximum sales charge not to exceed five percent
of the net asset value per share at the time of sale be adopted. At the same
time the Commission asked Congress for express statutory authority to alter the
maximum sales charge by rule or regulation when, in its sole discretion, the public
interest or investor protection was involved. 4
The SEC 1966 Report sheds little light on the legal and/or economic justi-
fication for a five per cent maximum sales load, and there is no assurance that the
21 SEC 1966 REPORT 221.
22 Id. at 222.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 223. See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on
S. 1659, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1, at 154-55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hear-
ings]. But cf. Simpson, Costs in the Distribution of Mutual Fund Shares, CONFERENCE ON
MUTUAL FUNDS 101-10 (CCH 1967).
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elaborate law-making machinery of Congress would not soon have to be re-
activated to correct this rather arbitrary means of rate fixing. It is interesting to
note that while in 1967 the SEC was asking for a fixed maximum sales charge, in
1940, when the passage of the Investment Company Act was under consideration,
the SEC's chief spokesman testified that the principal reason for the SEC's re-
luctance to recommend the imposition of a statutory maximum on sales load was
the fear that "immediately the maximum would become the minimum in every
case."
'2 5
During the 1967-68 legislative session, companion bills were introduced in
the Senate (S. 1659)2 and the House of Representatives (H.R. 9510)27 to
implement the recommendations contained in the SEC 1966 Report. Although
the ninetieth Congress did not enact any legislation amending the 1940 Act,
the Senate did pass an amended version of S. 1659 which provided that the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. [the "NASD"] may prescribe rules
to prevent "excessive" sales loads, but at any time after eighteen months from
the date of enactment of the legislation the SEC would have the power to alter
or supplement any such rules adopted by the NASD.2"
V. Proposed Amendment to Rule 22d-1
While there was still debate concerning the unsuccessful 1967 proposed
mutual fund legislation, on October 7, 1968, in Release Number 5507 under the
1940 Act, the Commission announced its proposal to amend Rule 22d-1 to delete
the present prohibition against certain group purchases for quantity discounts on
investment company securities.2" The proposed amendment to Rule 22d-1 specif-
ically deletes the present language of the rule which excludes group purchases from
the definition of the term "any person," and substitutes therefor the definition of
the word "person" as set forth in Section 2(a) (27) of the 1940 Act. 0 Curiously
enough, this proposal came less than one month after the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee voted to adjourn debate on the pending mutual
fund legislation (H.R. 9510) for the remainder of the congressional session,
which vote immediately followed the decision of the House Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance not to consider further the mutual fund bill passed
by the Senate (S. 3724). Apparently, however, the Commission did not consider
the refusal of Congress to pass legislation affecting sales charges as the final
decision on the matter.
25 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S.
3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 290 (1940).
26 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
27 H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
28 Senator John Sparkman (D. Ala.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, on January 10, 1969, introduced new mutual fund legislation in the ninety-first
Congress (see note 3 supra) which is virtually identical to S. 3724 (S. 1659, as amended)
passed by the Senate in 1968.
29 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968) [hereinafter cited as
Release Number 5507].
30 Section 2(a) (27) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(27) (1964), states that
"'person' means a natural person or a company." The word "company" is further defined in
Section 2(a) (8) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (8) (1964), to mean "a corporation
... or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not."
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A. Expanding the "Any Person" Concept
The scope of the Commission's proposed amendment to Rule 22d-1 [here-
inafter sometimes referred to as the "proposed amended rule"] appears to be
in conflict with the statute itself. The statute, in effect, provides that the retail
offering price of the shares of any mutual fund shall be uniform to all purchasers
of that fund making the same dollar investment. However, the proposed amended
rule would allow purchasers of the same mutual fund to pay different offering
prices at the same time, depending upon the ability of their broker-dealer to or-
ganize a group large enough to warrant a reduction in the applicable sales charge
for that fund. Consequently, the proposed amended rule would discriminate be-
tween customers in the sale of mutual fund shares by allowing an individual to
purchase the same mutual fund share at a different price depending upon the size
of the "group" of which the individual is a "member." 31
While the volume discount concept which developed since the 1940 Act
may have a rational basis founded upon economies generated through volume
purchases, for such a volume discount to work on a non-discriminatory basis
and to assure price uniformity, there must be some criteria of eligibility for the
discount. As presently constituted, the definition of "any person" contained in
Rule 22d-1 is designed to achieve this purpose by restricting the availability of
the volume discount to a single customer investing his own money or funds which
he controls.
In adopting Rule 22d-1 in 1958, the Commission criticized industry
practices which had developed over the years involving discounts to groups,
observing that such groupings violated the "purpose and intent7' of Section 22 (d)
because price discrimination was involved. The Commission stated that it
is therefore of the opinion that there is no sufficient basis for exempting
such group purchases in the rule and 'has included in the rule an inter-
pretive definition of "any person" which makes clear that group purchases,
whether directly or through a trustee or agent, cannot qualify as a single
purchase for pricing purposes under Section 22(d).32
The proposed amended rule goes beyond merely reversing the Commission's
previous position on group purchases. By allowing for the aggregation of un-
related purchases by unrelated persons the proposed amended rule would, in
effect, be repealing by administrative action the statutory requirement of price
uniformity. As an example, individual investors who do not have access to a
large brokerage firm or who, for various reasons, decide to deal with a small
brokerage firm, are discriminated against if the smaller brokerage firm is not in
a position to obtain the same quantity discount as a larger brokerage firm, due
solely to the latter's ability to organize a larger "group"' of purchasers at any
given time. The proposed amended rule would not only create discrimination
among purchasers, but also among broker-dealers, since broker-dealers having a
greater clientele would be in a position to place larger "group orders" with a
31 Cf. text accompanying note 20 supra.
32 SEC Release No. 2798, supra note 17.
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mutual fund at any specific time, and thereby receive a distinct and unfair
advantage over smaller broker-dealers.
While the Commission stated in Release Number 5507 that such revised
group discounts can be offered on a uniform and non-discriminatory basis, we
believe such variations in sales charges must somehow be tied to either the
economies of distribution, a factor which was not even mentioned in the Release,
or to some other valid basis of classification not alluded to by the Commission.
Thus, built into the mechanics of the proposed amended rule are capricious
classifications and discriminations between customers and broker-dealers that
have no rational basis, or at least none that can be discerned in the Commission's
Release.
B. Prejudicing the Fund's Stockholders?
Another form of discrimination which could evolve from the proposed
amended rule affects the existing stockholders of the mutual fund. "In order
to avoid problems under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940," the Commission noted
in its Release Number 5507 that "all group purchases would be required to be
handled in a manner substantially similar to ordinary brokerage transactions."
This means that where limitations are imposed on the rights of an individual
participant, or special charges are made, a separate security might possibly be
created which would be required to be registered under the Securities Act of
1933. In turn, the issuer of this separate security might also become an invest-
ment company required to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940.33
To avoid creating a separate security and investment company, no special fees
or charges can be imposed on the participants under the "group purchases."'"
We therefore question who would bear the possible additional costs incurred by
the transfer agent of the investment company in processing the individual ac-
counts of each participant under a "single group purchase." It would appear to
be unfair and discriminatory to the existing stockholders if such additional costs
are paid by the fund.
C. What Is the "Current Offering Price"?
A further area of conflict between the proposed amended rule and Section
22(d) is that the latter provides that the current public offering price must be
described in the prospectus. In the 1941 opinion of the Commission's General
Counsel, it was stated that:
[I]t is permissible to charge varying prices for varying amounts of redeemable
securities based on a uniform scale of sales loads for different amounts
33 For example, such problems would arise if:
(1) sums were accumulated for material periods of time before investment; (2)
special fees or charges, such as a front end load, were imposed; (3) limitations were
imposed on the right of participants to withdraw securities held in custody; or (4)
limitations were imposed on the rights and privileges of participants as shareholders.
SEC Release No. 5507.
34 Id.
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purchased. But, in my opinion, section 22 (d) requires the "current offering
price" to be one. readily ascertainable by a reading of the prospectus.
Therefore, I believe that the charging of varying prices is not permissible
unless the prospectus definitely sets forth the price which a purchaser of any
specific amount of redeemable securities will have to pay.3 5  (Emphasis
added.)
Since the amount of quantity discounts available under the proposed amended
rule would depend upon the size of the group, a prospective investor will not
know at any given time by a reading of the prospectus what discount he is
entitled to for his own purchase, and therefore, the "current offering price"
cannot be "readily ascertainable by a reading of the prospectus." This un-
certainty in knowing the price of the mutual fund shares a customer is currently
purchasing dearly seems to be contrary to the statutory requirements as pre-
viously interpreted by the Commission.
D. Suitability Problems
The proposed amended rule also leads to problems in the area of "suit-
ability,"" since unlike the present limitations in Rule 22d-1, the proposed
amended rule would encourage the formation of groups which have no purpose
other than to qualify their "members" for discounts. Not only is it possible that
a particular mutual fund security purchased by a single "group" might not be
a suitable investment vehicle for each member, but the broker-dealer offering
the security might not be able to meet the requirements of knowing his customer's
"financial situation and needs."
E. Other Problems
Release Number 5507 also states that the proposed amended rule would
not relax the obligations imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 on broker-dealers
and other distributors of mutual fund shares to provide a prospectus to all persons
who are solicited. Allowing quantity discounts to large groups, such as medical,
dental or other professional associations, could present serious problems in
compliance with the prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act of
1933.s" Furthermore, since the offer of the quantity discount would obviously
have to be made to all members of such an association, in order to avoid
problems of discrimination, the securities of the mutual fund would have to meet
the Blue Sky requirements of each state in which a member of such an associa-
tion resides. Most states require registration or qualification of the mutual fund
35 SEC Release No. 89, supra note 9.
36 Article III, Section 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., requires that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such cus-
tomer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
NATIONAL AssocrATIoN OF SEcuarrms DEALERS, REPRINT OF THE MANUAL 1 2152 '(CCH
1968). See also Wilson, Interpretation of NASD's Suitability Requirements in Sales of Mutual
Fund Shares, CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 21-27 (CCH 1967).
37 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1964).
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shares even if the offer to purchase such shares is solicited in the state by a
broker-dealer outside the state. In addition, the soliciting broker-dealer might
have to register as a "broker-dealer" in each state in which solicited members
of the association reside.
F. Conclusion
The obvious conflicts between the proposed amended rule and Section
22(d) as discussed above present sufficient support for the conclusion that this
amendment should not be adopted. Furthermore, although quantity discounts
are offered by investment companies on a voluntary basis, adoption of the
proposed amended rule would leave the investment company industry no choice
other than to compete in price-cutting for the favor of such group purchases
even though this, in turn, could disrupt the orderly distribution of mutual fund
shares and lower the standards of selling - all in contradiction of the spirit of
the 1940 Act.
VI. Section 22(d) : To Maintain or Repeal?
Despite the Commission's own reluctance, as expressed in its 1966 Report,
to recommend legislation repealing Section 22(d)," on January 16, 1969,
Senator Thomas J. McIntyre introduced legislation which included the follow-
ing reference to Section 22 (d) :
Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 . . is repealed."9
In our opinion, the repeal of Section 22 (d) would re-create the chaos and abuses
which Congress had hoped to eliminate in the passage of the 1940 Act.
It is well recognized by both the SEC and the investment company industry
that the present retail price maintenance provisions of Section 22(d) assure an
orderly and continuous system of distribution which would not otherwise exist.
Such continuous distribution is essential because of the unique redeemability
feature inherent in mutual funds. Although mutual funds generally have suf-
ficient cash or liquid assets to meet current redemptions, the major source of
funds for this purpose is the new money obtained through the continuous sale
of its shares to new or existing shareholders. In the absence of a continuous
cash flow, the mutual fund might have to keep a degree of liquidity which might
not be consistent with the fund's investment appraisal of the market at any
particular time.
The repeal of Section 22(d) would produce other consequences which it
is believed would have an adverse effect on the public interest. Undoubtedly, a
secondary market in mutual fund shares would develop with such shares being
traded in much the same way and by the same firms that handle over-the-counter
securities generally. Various trading firms would then "make-markets" in mutual
fund shares, and over-the-counter retailers would acquire shares from these
38 SEC 1966 REPORT 223.
39 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
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market-makers to meet specific customer demand. Consequently, dealers would
not tend to specialize in the retail sale of mutual fund shares since the salesmen's
income would be highly unstable because other dealers not so specializing would
be able to offer the same shares at a lower price-a discriminatory situation
which Section 22(d) was primarily designed to prevent. No dealer would
promote and sell this form of long-term investment in the same manner as a
growth stock, since it is the sales charge that compensates the salesman for the
time and effort essential to the sale of this type of security.
It has been argued that the over-the-counter market cannot support a wide
distribution of mutual fund shares. If this is true, a negative cash flow to the
funds based on higher redemptions than sales, particularly in periods of market
stress, may develop. This poses the question as to whether the public interest is
best served by encouraging short-term trading in individual issues at the expense
of the long-term investment objectives of most mutual funds.40 Advocates of
repealing Section 22(d) argue that the growth of a secondary market in mutual
fund shares which would follow the repeal of Section 22(d) would soften the
redemption problem since an investor desiring to sell would likely find a buyer in
the firms making a market in the particular mutual fund shares. However, pre-
1940 history has demonstrated that the development of a secondary market, with
bargaln-basement price competition, would only stimulate an excess of redemp-
tions over sales. A former president of the Investment Company Institute has
appropriately commented:
In periods of financial stress when some increase in redemptions might be
expected, the secondary market-making activities of the trading houses which
have no obligation to continue trading would tend to dry up and the mutual
funds would have to honor their own guarantee of redemption.4'
Another reason advanced for the repeal of Section 22(d) is that since 1940
price competition at the retail sales level has been allegedly hampered by the
price maintenance provisions of the 1940 Act.2 We believe that this contention
is without merit since Section 22(d) does not require that all mutual funds
impose the same sales charge, but rather that the shares of any one mutual fund
be offered at a uniform offering price. In fact, the sales charges of more than
four hundred publicly offered mutual funds range from no sales charge at all
to those charging a maximum of approximately eight and one-half per cent.
Professor Louis Loss, in supporting the mandate of Section 22 (d), stated:
Very likely this uniform price system has been a material factor in the
dramatic growth of the mutual funds. And it does not seem to have
stifled competition, to judge from the number and variety of new entries
into the industry as well as the range of sales charges, which run from 9
percent of the offering price down to 2 percent or, in the case of a few
companies, zero.43
40 See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 321.
41 Statement of Dorsey Richardson, Former President of Investment Company Institute,
September 12, 1966, at 15 (on file at the Library of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Washington, D. C.).
42 See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 152.
43 1 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 410.
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In connection with attempts to create price competition on the retail level,
consideration must be given to the potential deterioration in the quality of salesmen
and the result this would have on the necessary services provided to the customer.
It is generally recognized that the mutual fund industry imposes self-regulatory
burdens unlike most other industries dealing with the public. Accordingly, securi-
ties firms are becoming increasingly selective in hiring salesmen because of the costs
of their training and supervising. Retail price-cutting is obviously not conducive to
budgeting for this type of self-regulation, and firms would likely be under
increased economic pressures to lower standards in recruiting and training new
salesmen.
It could also be argued that the repeal of Section 22(d) may lead salesmen
who are not under proper supervision increasingly to sell mutual funds as
speculative trading vehicles, thus making portfolio management more difficult.
The management of the fund would therefore be under increased pressures to
show quick, spectacular performances to discourage salesmen from switching
customers to another mutual fund. Furthermore, to the extent that this trading
pattern develops, funds not performing well at a given moment would be faced
with increased redemptions, which in itself would probably complicate portfolio
management.
The 1963 Special Study of the SEC expressed concern over "switching" of
mutual fund shares and made a specific recommendation that the Commission
exercise its rule-making power to curtail recommendations of switches from one
mutual fund to another.4 The sale of mutual funds without the protection of
Section 22(d) could create a climate which would encourage salesmen to
recommend switching, and this would clearly not be in accord with the philos-
ophy underlying this Special Study recommendation.
In our opinion, the sale of mutual fund shares through direct dealer
competition with no uniformity in sales charges for the same mutual fund shares
would be a totally unrealistic approach for an industry which requires and
demands "suitability" as the prime consideration in the purchase and sale of
securities. We therefore believe that the repeal of Section 22 (d) would tend to
create the potential for:
(1) discriminatory pricing in favor of large volume purchasers
who are generally in a position to arrive at ad hoc prices by negotiation;
(2) speculative market trading rather than long-term investing; and
(3) the impairment and withdrawal of the professional services
needed in the distribution of mutual fund shares.
VII. Conclusion
Although the dust of battle has not yet settled on the recent attacks made
on Section 22(d), and there may be still other attacks to follow, it is our con-
tention that the assaults launched by Senator McIntyre, Senator Sparkman and
the Securities and Exchange Commission are unrealistic in view of their possible
44 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, H.R.Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 164-65, 206-09, 212 '(1963).
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adverse effects on the effective distribution of mutual fund shares.
It should be apparent that Senator McIntyre's proposal to repeal Section
22(d) will force the investment company industry to endure the chaos and dis-
order that characterized the distribution of mutual fund shares prior to the
enactment of the 1940 Act. On the other hand, Senator Sparkman's bill takes
into account the wisdom of preserving the uniform price maintenance provisions,
but it attempts to enlarge the administrative jurisdiction of the SEC by allowing
the Commission to prevent an "excessive sales load"45 in lieu of an "unconscionable
or grossly excessive sales load" which the SEC now has the power to regulate.4"
Is Senator Sparkman's proposed amendment to Section 22(d) based on the
premise, as stated by the SEC in its 1966 Report, that current sales charges are
in fact excessive? If Senator Sparkman's proposal is based on this premise,
which we believe to be arbitrary and unsupportable, then we question whether
the enactment of his proposed amendent would not in fact lead to the adoption
of rules by both the NASD and the SEC fixing a scale of sales charges based on a
fictitious congressional fiat that the present structure includes "excessive sales
loads." '
With respect to the proposed amendment to Rule 22d-1, the SEC is, in
effect, emasculating the spirit and purpose of Section 22 (d) by allowing invest-
ment companies to encourage group purchases at quantity discounts which, we
believe, will engender price discrimination among both mutual fund purchasers
and dealers. The President of the Investment Company Institute, in comment-
ing to the Commission on the proposed amended rule, stated that:
[L]arge broker-dealers with their many branches would be impelled to
regard their unrelated customers, the butcher from Los Angeles, the baker
from Santa Fe, the candlestick maker from Tallahassee, as an "organized
group" of customers, for purposes of a quantity discount, with the result
that the emphasis in selling would very likely be on discount rather than
suitability of the security."
In the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, the present methods
employed by investment companies assure an orderly and continuous distribu-
tion of mutual fund shares, with full disclosure and freedom of choice to the
investing public in furtherance of the mandate of the 1940 Act. When the dust
of battle finally does settle, we trust that Section 22 (d) and the present rules
promulgated thereunder will emerge intact.
45 S. 34, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(b) (1969).
46 Section 22(b) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (b) (1964). See Rappaport, The SECs
Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, 1967 SECURITIES LAWS
AND REGULATIONS INSTITUTE AT UNIVERSITY OF MrAIas LAw CENTER 177.
47 See remarks of Gordon D. Henderson regarding difficulties in justifying particular sales
load limitations, printed in The Financing of Sales of Mutual Fund Shares, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
768, 798-99 (1967).
48 Letter from Robert L. Augenblick, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Nov. 27,
1968 (on file at the Library of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C.).
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